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ABSTRACT

Behavior within an experiment is generally explained by either a pure profit
motive or a response to the context of the experiment which is likely driven by
different factors such as individuals' environmental friendliness. Are participants in
laboratory experiments responding to the context of the experimental setting and
not merely to a profit motive? Using a preliminary analysis, I draw evidence from
data collected in a two-stage laboratory experiment designed and conducted by
Palm-Forster et al. (In Press) at the University of Delaware. In the first stage of the
experiment, participants performed a series of tasks concerning their tradeoffs
between monetary profits and environmental friendliness. In the second stage,
participants made a choice of donating to a large environmental organization. In
total, 156 undergraduate students participated in the experiment. The analysis in
this paper provides preliminary results that need to be verified in future research
after overcoming key model specification issues.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The last few decades have witnessed vast technological advances bringing along with it
unfavorable byproducts that interfere with and have had lasting impacts on the
ecosystems. Therefore, there arises a need to understand the importance of conservation
and ecosystem preservation and the steps to remedy the disruption. According to the
Glossary of Environment Statistics, ‘environmental protection’ can be categorized as the
activity to preserve or restore the quality of environmental media by reducing the
production of pollutants or the presence of polluting substances which encompasses
changes in production techniques and consumption habits (Glossary of Environment
Statistics, Studies in Methods, Series F, No. 67, United Nations, New York, 1997).
With the growing need for awareness and conservation, there has also been a
remarkable increase in the number of environmental organizations catering to a host of
problems at a national and international level most of which are non-governmental, notfor-profit organizations. One of the most important roles that these Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) can play in global environmental governance, is to provide up-todate information on critical issues in their respective fields. Addressing problematic areas
also becomes easier in the absence of bureaucracy.
While the problems addressed by these organizations are all important, it is of
note that they are all run with motives to restore ecological balance and not profit
maximization. In other words, a nonprofit reinvests the money it makes back into its
causes

and

missions

instead

of

dividing

profits

among

its

employees

or

shareholders. The principal sum and subsequent money is obtained by way of
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governmental grants or charitable donations. This means, lesser donations have a
negative impact on the effectiveness of the NGOs.
The Chesapeake Bay foundation as stated on their web page, is one such
organization that works to reduce pollution emissions in the Chesapeake Bay and its
rivers and streams. Founded in 1967, the organization aims at educating, advocating and
restoring the water quality in the Bay by reduction of toxins and improving oxygen
levels.
Given the importance of donations to these organizations as they facilitate
functioning, in order to understand human behavior, economists have turned to the
method of experimental models used in the physical sciences. Applying a ceteris paribus
condition, it becomes easier to observe behavioral patterns from different individuals
which would otherwise be very difficult. These behavioral traits can be explained by
different motives that drive an individuals’ decision making. As Orne (1962) points out,
the behavior of a subject is a reflection of their perception of the experiment which may
differ from the views of the experimenter. Thus, providing context to the experiment may
help elicit better responses from participants.
In this major paper, I observe individual behavioral patterns in the context of
nonpoint source (NPS) pollution1 theory with respect to decisions that lead to income
1

According to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 2018, “Nonpoint source pollution
generally results from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, drainage, seepage or
hydrologic modification. Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution, unlike pollution from industrial and
sewage treatment plants, comes from many diffuse sources. NPS pollution is caused by rainfall or
snowmelt moving over and through the ground. As the runoff moves, it picks up and carries away
natural and human-made pollutants, finally depositing them into lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal
waters and ground waters.”
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generation. In the beginning of the experiment collected and owned by Palm-Forster et
al., (in press), participants were provided a text about nonpoint source pollution and at the
end of the experiment, participants were presented with a donation decision to an
organization (The Chesapeake Bay Foundation) who’s objective is to address the
problem of NPS pollution. In this major paper, I study if an individual in the
experimental setting responds to the context provided.
Using the experimental data collected and owned by Palm-Forster et al. (in press),
that employs a two-stage laboratory experiment, I observe participant’s behavior within a
laboratory setting. In the first stage, participants were provided with a set of instructions
after which they made management decisions that determined their earnings at the end of
the game. In the second stage, participants filled out a short demographic survey after
which they chose whether or not to donate to an environmental organization from their
respective payout.
First stage management decisions included the choice of a conservation
technology or a conventional technology and a management decision that collectively
determined a pollution outcome in a nonpoint source pollution game. The take home
earnings of a participant comprised of a general income awarded to the individual, net
production income resulting from management decisions, minus the cost of a
conservation technology when adopted. Choosing to adopt a conservation technology
would result in a negative impact on payout by increasing costs of production on the one
hand and yield a positive impact on the environment by reducing pollution on the other
hand. The donation decision in the second stage of the experiment was a voluntary
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payout made from the amount that the participant earned through decisions taken in the
first stage of the experiment.
The assumption is that, adopting a conservation technology or reducing the
quantity of inputs to production can reduce the level of pollution emitted by the firm. A
decision to donate would result in a decrease in total payout to the participant. Hence,
participants that are driven by a pure profit motive would maximize their utility by
adopting the conventional (free) technology, polluting at a level that maximizes their
profits and opting not to donate. However, if a participant chooses decisions that result in
low pollution which could be driven by the adoption of the costly conservation
technology, and/or chooses to donate, this signals to the experimental investigator a nonprofit motive. Rather, the existence of a context driven response. Our goal is to study
whether participants in a laboratory setting respond to the context of the experimental
setting.
Preliminary estimation results suggest a negative relationship between individual
pollution levels and the amount donated at the end of the experiment. Simply put, a
participant making decisions to pollute less is more likely to donate more. Further,
individuals that received lower earnings were more likely to donate to the Chesapeake
Bay Foundation. These results are based a convenient model estimation strategy and need
to be verified by future research.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section covers the
literature that has been reviewed in relevance of this study, followed by the theoretical
framework and the design of the experiment which was sourced from Palm-Forster et al.
(in press). Next, I employ a linear regression technique to estimate the presence of a

4

context motive which is presented in the results section, followed by a conclusion that
includes scope for further improvement.

5

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

One of the methodological achievements of experimental economics is the ability to
create experimental settings that are designed to resemble real world settings with
features such as institutional rules, endowments and incentives which are essential in
making predictions based on economic theory about behavior (Smith, 1982). When
observing an individual’s behavior in a laboratory setting, one must therefore consider
different aspects that might influence behavioral patterns.
In the following subsections, I first review literature based on behavior in the
context of NPS pollution, then I review individuals’ donation behavior followed by
donation behavior to environmental organizations and lastly, I review literature on the
influence of context to behavior in an experiment.

2.1. Individuals’ behavior in the context of nonpoint source pollution
The pollution of an individual is difficult to observe with respect to nonpoint pollution
problems when observing ambient pollution levels as the pollution levels are based on a
random distribution of abatement technologies adopted and only the combined effects are
observed. Offering an incentive for total pollution levels can help control for this
(Segerson, 1986). In general, with an incentive scheme in play, an individual or firm will
start responding to cumulative pollution emissions (Xepapadeas,1992). Employing
different treatments including a no policy control, Palm- Forster et al. (in press) controls
for this potential problem by imposing penalties for total pollution of a group exceeding a
pre-determined limit. Since the current paper utilizes data from Palm-Forster et al. (in
press), the issue of observing individual pollution is considered here.
6

2.2. Individual donation behavior
In the past half century, there has been a large flow of charitable gifts irrespective of
economic conditions (List, 2011). Traditionally, a pure altruistic approach would explain
motivations to donation (Andreoni, 1989). However, there may be other factors that
influence donation such as the feel-good factor or a ‘warm-glow’ obtained from the act of
giving (Andreoni, 1989) or social pressure (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). The pure
altruism model suggests that giving is solely motivated by the output of the charity, but
an impure altruistic model looks at the influence of a warm-glow experienced by the
donor (Vesterlund et al., 2008). While these explain motivations to donation, an
individual may not want to give but may dislike saying no, for example, due to social
pressure (DellaVigna et al., 2012). Within a laboratory however, there may be different
motivations that drive giving. It could be driven by a profit motive, social pressure or
individual perception driven by the context of the experiment. In this study, the social
pressure aspect is controlled for by design of the experiment collected and owned by
Palm-Forster et al., (in press) wherein participants are ensured complete anonymity. An
individual operating with a profit motive would be less likely to donate. However, if
decisions are driven by the participants perception or the context of the experiment, the
individual would be more likely to donate.

2.3. Donation behavior to environmental organizations
Mazar and Zhong (2010) remark that the recent growth of the market for environmentally
friendly products reflects a change in the social and moral values of consumers. Their
7

studies show that exposure to an environmentally friendly product would result in a more
altruistic behavioral pattern. Purchasing choices reflect not only price and quality
preferences (Monroe, 1976), but also reflect an individual’s beliefs, values and norms
(Caruana, 2007). Therefore, in an experiment involving donation to an environmental
organization, providing information on the background and mission of the respective
organization can increase expose and thereby increase donations.

2.4. Influence of context on participants’ behavior in experiments
Contextual factors appear to have a significant impact on actions (Levitt and List, 2007).
In a series of experiments conducted by Henrich et al. (2005), it was found that a group
of participants receiving identical instructions about the description of the game, payoffs
and incentives, responded differently based on the context that the participants
themselves brought to the game. An experimental investigator could lack complete
control over the entire context within which a decision is made (Harrison and List, 2004).
Therefore, providing context can provide a better understanding of a particular
environment and reduce confusion among participants. With decisions regarding
pollution choices or concerning bribes, contextual instructions could affect behavior in
the experiment, but this effect could be desirable as it is related to the research question
(Alekseev et al., 2016).
The above literature review reveals significant research on donation behavior and
individual’s behavior in an experiment. However, there seems to be a gap in the literature
addressing motivation to donation observed in experimental settings. Although this paper
8

is based on the experimental data sourced from Palm-Forster et al. (in press), it differs
from and contributes to the existing literature by addressing the gap in the literature
considering motivations to individual’s donation behavior to an environmental
organization within an experiment. In addition to a profit motive, I observe if context of
the experiment plays a role in decision making within a laboratory. Results suggest that
an individual choosing environmentally friendly decisions and polluting less, is more
likely to donate more at the end of the experiment indicating that participants do respond
to context.

9

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Context
Profit
Others

Technology
Choice

Pollution

Management
Decision

Firm Profit

Motives

Figure 3.1: Structure of the theory

As shown in figure 3.1, an individuals’ behavior within a laboratory setting can be
broadly driven by motives such as that of pure profit, the context of the experiment or
others such as warm-glow effect or an altruistic approach. With relevance to this study, I
consider two motives that impact behavior, namely profit and context. An individual
responding to a pure profit motive is found to make decisions that result in higher
pollution emissions and solely enhance take home earnings at the end of the experiment.
On the other hand, if a participant is responding to the context of the experiment, the
decisions arising from this does not increase profit. Rather, it translates to
environmentally friendly decisions resulting in low pollution emissions coupled with the
choice to donate at the end of the experiment.
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Pollution emission is determined by the management decision of the firm as well as
the choice of technology. Following Palm-Forster et al. (in press), the firm’s profitmaximization problem is given by
maxxi,ai p(xi, ai) = g + b(xi) – c*ai

(1)

Where g is the subsidy/government benefit provided to each firm earning a net
production income of b(xi) with xi representing the quantity of inputs used in production.
It is assumed that there is no additional cost for the adoption of the conventional
technology. Therefore, the cost of adopting the conservation technology is denoted by c,
and the charge associated with the choice of technology is denoted by c*ai. From this
design, a negative correlation can be expected between the choice of technology adopted
and firm profit.
Considering the individuals that decided to donate at the end of the experiment, I
observe if their decisions were based on underlying ideas or a consistent profit motive.
This is observed by the choices made by the individual in the production process,
wherein adopting a conservation technology would have a negative impact on payout by
increasing costs of production but a positive impact on the environment by reducing
pollution emission. In addition, I observe the existence of a relationship between
donations and the level of pollution emitted. These explanations lead to the following two
hypotheses:

H1: There is no correlation between individual pollution and donation
In order to test this hypothesis, I estimate the following regression equation.
11

Individual pollutionij = b0 + b1donate + b2 gender + b3 economic classes + b4 age + b5
international + µij

(2)

where individual pollutionij is an outcome determined by the choice of technology
adopted by the individual ‘i’ in round ‘j’ expressed in unit terms. bn represents the
coefficients of the independent variables. Donate is a dummy variable which takes the
binary values of 0 and 1. If a participant chose to donate at the end of the experiment this
takes the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. b2, b3, b4 and b5 represents the coefficients of
demographic details such gender, number of economic classes taken, age and whether or
not the student is an international candidate. µij is the error term of the specification using
pooled data. If an individual is responding to the context of the experiment, we expect b1
to have a negative sign, indicating a negative relationship between donations and
individual pollution.

H2: There is no correlation between firm profit and donation
To test the above hypothesis, the following regression equation has been estimated
Firm profitij = a0 + a1donate + a2 gender + a3 economic classes + a4 age + a5
international + eij

(3)

where firm profitij is an outcome determined by the receipt of subsidy, choice of
technology adopted by the individual ‘i’ in round ‘j’. an represents the coefficients of the
independent variables. Donate is a dummy variable which takes the binary values of 0
and 1. If a participant chose to donate at the end of the experiment this takes the value of
12

1 and 0 otherwise. a2, a3, a4 and a5 represents the coefficients of demographic details
such gender, number of economic classes taken, age and whether or not the student is an
international candidate. eij is the error term of the specification using pooled data. If an
individual is responding to the context of the experiment, we expect a1 to have a negative
sign.
The above two hypotheses along with the result are tabulated below in table 3.1

Table 3.1: Research hypotheses
Research Question

Are participants in a
laboratory experiment
responding to the context of
the experimental setting and
not merely to a profit
motive?

Null Hypotheses

Test

Result and Interpretation

b1= 0 (There is no

p < 0.01

Reject. Lower the individual
pollution, higher the amount
donated

p < 0.01

Reject. lower the firm
profits, higher the amount of
donation.

correlation between
individual pollution and
donation)
𝛼1= 0 (There is no
correlation between
profits and donation)
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4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

This section of the paper is based on the experimental design and data collected at the
University of Delaware by Dr. Palm-Forster, Dr. Messer and Dr. Suter who have kindly
granted me permission to analyze this dataset for the purpose of my major paper. Below
is a summarized description of their design which is described in more detail in PalmForster et al. (in press)2.
Using the data collected, I observe participant’s behavior within the setting of a
laboratory experiment collected in the Spring of 2016 at the University of Delaware. A
total of 156 undergraduate students were recruited using lists managed by the Department
of Economics. The only information provided to participants at this stage was an e-mail
stating that they were selected to participate in a study that involved decision-making and
would take approximately 90 minutes with an average payout of $30. The minimum and
maximum payout to participants at the end of the experiment amounted to $21.50 and
$72.75 respectively. Since the average sum per hour was up to $20, this was similar to
payments resulting from other experiments such as Fooks et al., (2016), Arnold et al.,
(2013), Messer et al., (2014) and Suter et al., (2012).
The experiment consisted of six stages in total. In the first stage, participants
received audio as well as written instructions about the experiment. In the second stage,
they were asked to participate in a practice round which had no implications on the

2

For finer details please refer to Palm-Forster, L.H., J.F. Suter, and K.D. Messer. In Press. “Experimental
evidence on policy approaches that link agricultural subsidies to water quality outcomes.” American
Journal of Agricultural Economics. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aay057
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payment received. This was to ensure participants understood the details of experiment.
In the third stage, individuals took part in the experiment, which was similar to the
practice round but decisions from this round had financial implications on profit earned.
In the fourth stage, participants took part in an adapted Holt-Laury lottery which helped
the experimental investigator gain insight on respective risk preferences. The fifth stage
involved a short demographic survey on details such as gender, race, age, number of
economic classes taken as well as if the student was a domestic or international
candidate. In the final part of the experiment, participants were provided with a short
script about the Chesapeake Bay foundation and they were given a choice to donate to the
respective organisation. Any donation made was deducted from the total earnings at the
end of the experiment.
All of the firms in their group were identical in terms of potential net production
income, profits, and pollution relationships. Between each student, there were privacy
barriers setup to avoid other participants from viewing an individual’s screen. Individuals
were randomly assigned to a six-person group that they were unable to identify. This
ensured complete anonymity in the responses received.
Each experimental session consisted of four treatments (C1, T2, T3 and T4) with
each treatment comprising of five decision rounds. In each of the rounds, participants
were given the choice to simultaneously choose between a costly conservation
technology or a conventional technology and one of ten management decisions (refer to
table:4.1). The choice of the management decision coupled with the technology choice
jointly determined the pollution outcome. At the beginning of every round participants
were awarded 400 experimental dollars which resembled a subsidy. The cost of the

15

conservation technology was 150 experimental dollars which was subtracted from the
firm’s profits for each round of the game when chosen.
The four treatments included a no policy control (C1) in which the choice of a
management decision with high levels of pollution had no negative financial implication
on the participant. The cost of adopting the conservation technology to reduce pollution
was fixed at 150 experimental dollars for every treatment. In the linear tax treatment
(T2), if the total pollution of the group exceeded a specified threshold, each firm paid a
linear tax for every unit of pollution above the said limit. In the linear subsidy reduction
(T3), instead of a linear tax, if the total pollution exceeded the threshold limit, each firm
within the group incurred a subsidy reduction for every unit of pollution above the limit.
The limit of subsidy reduction was capped at 400 experimental dollars which was the
subsidy received at the beginning of each round. T4 was similar to T3 in terms of linear
subsidy reduction for total pollution emissions above the limit. However, in this
treatment, if a firm adopted the costly conservation technology there was an assurance of
no penalty.
After the experiment, individuals participated in an adapted Holt-Laury (2002)
risk-elicitation procedure that helped ascertain risk preferences. Participants were then
instructed to fill out a short survey that collected demographic data such as gender, age,
race, academic major, home state or country and number of economic courses taken.
At the end of the survey, participants were provided a description about an
environmental organization as shown in figure 4.1, that comprised of details such as
when the organization was founded, what it stands for, and a short note on what it aims at
achieving. The organization used in this experiment was the Chesapeake Bay foundation

16

whose motto is to reduce pollution in the Bay, it’s rivers and streams. Students were then
given the option to donate to the organization. If an individual opted to donate to the
organization, this sum was deducted from the net profits earned at the end of the
experiment. The description and donation information provided to all the participants
were identical. All decisions were made within privacy barriers to control for a social
pressure motive and payout electronically calculated at the end of the experiment. The
range of donations were found to range from $0 to $10 with a total of 23 participants
choosing to donate.
In the experiment instructions, participants were told that their decisions impacted
the level of NPS pollution generated by their firm in the experimental setting. This
provided the individual with the context within which the experiment was set. The tasks
and decision making that were asked of the participants all linked to this underlying text.
By concluding the experiment with a donation decision to a real environmental
organisation that works towards mitigating water pollution helps the experimental
investigator to analyse if responses are context driven.

17

Figure 4.1: Screenshot of donation information provided

The take-home final earnings of an individual consisted of the net profits earned
through the experiment with $600 experimental dollars equivalent to $1 plus the payout
from the risk-elicitation procedure minus the donation.
(Refer to source: Palm-Forster et al. (in press), for finer details on the experimental
design.)

18

Table 4.1: Emissions and Profits related to management decisions

Management
Decision

Technology 1

Technology 2

(Conventional)

(Conservational)

General
Earnings

Net
Production
Income

A

400

40

440

0.0

290

0.0

B

400

150

550

1.0

400

0.5

C

400

240

640

2.0

490

1.0

D

400

310

710

3.0

560

1.5

E

400

360

760

4.0

610

2.0

F

400

390

790

5.0

640

2.5

G

400

400

800

6.0

650

3.0

H

400

390

790

7.0

640

3.5

I

400

360

760

8.0

610

4.0

J

400

310

710

9.0

560

4.5

Profit

Source: Palm-Forster et al. (in press).
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Emissions

Profit

Emissions

5. RESULTS

From the data collected and owned by Palm-Forster et al. (in press), I observe
individual behavior within an experimental setting. A participant could either be driven
by a pure profit motive and make decisions to stimulate earnings at the end of the
experiment or could be influenced by the context of the experiment and make
environmentally friendly choices. An individual who adopts the costly conservation
technology thereby polluting less, coupled with a decision to donate at the end of the
experiment is understood as being responsive to the context of the setting. It is observed
that individuals that choose lower pollution levels are more likely to donate. I further
analyse the relationship between firm profits and individual pollution. A negative
correlation suggests that an individual that earns lower profits from the experiment is
more likely to make a donation. It is to be noted that the results from this paper are
preliminary and not based on the best available model specifications.
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of key variables

Variable

Description

Mean

Min

Max

Observations

Gender

1 if participant is male, 0
otherwise

0.57

0

1

156

Donate

1 if participant donated, 0
otherwise

0.15

0

1

156

Donate amount

Amount donated at the end
of the experiment

0.40

0

10

156

Age

Age of participant

25

19

31

156

International

1 if participant is
international, 0 otherwise

0.24

0

1

156

Economics
classes

Number of economics
classes the participant had
taken prior to the current
semester

3.28

0

50

156

Lottery
winnings

Amount a participant won
from the lottery

3.29

0

39

156

Individual
pollution

Pollution generated by an
individual

5.7

0

9

156

Individual tax

Tax an individual incurred
when pollution exceeded the
threshold limit

23.9

0

468

156

Firm profit

Amount earned as a result
of subsidy received, net
production income and
choice of technology

722.68

290

800

156

Note: Averages computed by the author. Data taken from Palm-Forster et al. (in press).

From Table 5.1, it is observed that 57% of the participants were male. Out of the
156 participants, 23 individuals donated to the environmental organisation which is
approximately 15% of the sample. The average donation amount was $0.4 U.S dollars
and the mode of donations among individuals who donated was $2 U.S dollars.
Participants were at an average of 25 years old with approximately 24% comprising of
international students. On average, participants had taken 3 economics classes. Out of the
21

156 participants, 26 won the lottery with average winnings summing up to $19.76 U.S
dollars. The average individual pollution choices were found to be at 5.7 which is almost
at the profit maximizing decision choice as per table 1.1 that lists management choices.
The individual tax that a participant incurred when the total pollution in the watershed
exceeded a specified limit was found to be 23.9 experimental dollars. Mean individual
firm profits calculated as a function of subsidy received, net production income, minus
the cost of technology was found to be 722.68 experimental dollars.
Figure 5.1 exhibits the results of the binary choice of donation. Out of 156
participants 15 percent chose to donate at the end of the experiment.
Yes
15%

No
85%

Figure 5.1: Donation choice
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Figure 5.2 exhibits the range of donations that participants chose at the end of the
experiment. The majority of donations were centered at $0 with 133 participants
choosing not to donate. These participants are assumed to be comparatively lesser
environmentally friendly compared to the participants that donated. A total of 23
participants were found to donate. From this figure, I find that the mode of donations was
at $2.
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12

Donation amount

Figure 5.2: Donation amount including 0 donation

Figure 5.3 exhibits the distribution in the individual pollution levels. From this
figure, I find that a majority of participants chose to pollute at 3. The second highest
pollution choice is seen to at 6 which the level of pollution at the highest profit level.
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Figure 5.3: Individual pollution

Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of technology adoption between participants including
T4 wherein the adoption of the technology resulted in a no penalty on subsidy
irrespective of pollution emission in the watershed. Out of a total of 3120 observations,
the costly conservation technology was adopted 533 times.

Yes
17%

No
83%

Figure 5.4: Technology choice including T4
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Figure 5.5 exhibits the choice of technology in C1 exclusively. In this treatment, a higher
pollution choice had no financial penalty. Individuals who adopted the expensive
conservation technology in this no policy treatment round are assumed to be more
environmentally friendly. The conservation technology was chosen 21 times out of 780
observations.
Yes
3%

No
97%

Figure 5.5: Technology choice C1
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5.1. Linear Least Squares Regression Estimation

Although each individual participated in 20 rounds in the experiment, resulting in a panel
structure for the data, this paper does not account for either random of fixed effects. A
linear least squares regression using pooled data attempts to model the relationship
between two variables by fitting a linear equation to observed data points. One variable is
considered to be a dependent variable and the other is considered an explanatory variable.
Here I do not necessarily observe a causal relationship but rather a correlation between
the dependent and independent variables.
To test the first hypothesis, I observe the relationship between individual pollution
and donation amount. Represented in equation (2), the firm's individual pollution is the
dependent variable and the donation amount is the explanatory variable. A negative
coefficient of the independent variable or donation amount indicates a negative
relationship between the dependent (individual pollution) and the independent variable
(donation amount). In other words, as the individual pollution decreases, one can expect
the donation amount to increase.
To test the second hypothesis, I observe the relationship between firm profits and
donation amount. In this estimation, the firm profit is considered as the dependent
variable and the donation amount as the independent variable. A negative correlation
indicates lower the firm profits, higher the donation amount.
The estimation results from running a linear regression are summarized in table
5.1.1 and table 5.1.2.
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Table: 5.1.1: Linear least squares regression estimation to test the correlation between
individual pollution and donation
Variable
(Dependent variable =
individual pollution)
Donation amount
T2
T3
T4
Gender

Coefficients
(A)
-.0511***
(0.0161)

(B)
-.0595***
(.0162)

-2.4568***
(.0549)
-2.4213***
(.0549)
-2.3581***
(.0549)
-

-2.4568***
(.0544)
-2.4213***
(.0544)

.1787***
(.0303)
Economic classes
.0010***
(.0002)
Age
-.0001**
(.0000)
International
-.1797***
(.0302)
Intercept
5.7183***
5.774***
(.03935)
(.0687)
Observations
3100
3100
F statistic
726.93
377.30
R squared
0.48
0.49
Note: Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. *** 1% significance ** 5% significance * 10%
significance

From the above estimation results using the no policy control (C1) as the baseline I
observe the correlation between individual pollution and donation amount. In
specification (A), I find a statistically significant negative correlation between individual
pollution and donation amount. This indicates that an individual making decisions that
result in a low pollution level is more likely to donate more at the end of the experiment.
For every 1 dollar increase in donation, individual pollution decreased by 0.05 units. As
compared to the no policy control (C1), individuals in the treatments T2, T3 and T4 are
found to be polluting less as shown by the negative signs of the estimated coefficients of
27

T2, T3 and T4 respectively. These coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. Forty
eight percent of the variation in individual pollution is explained by specification A.
Controlling for demographic variables such as respondent’s age, gender, number
of economic classes taken and if the student is international, I estimate the correlation
between individual pollution and donation amount in specification (B). Comparing
specification A and B, the negative sign is consistent. Here, for every 1 dollar increase in
donation, individual pollution decreases by 0.06 units. Forty nine percent of the variation
in individual pollution is explained by specification B. I thus find a 1 percent increase in
the R squared value which can be explained by addition of the demographic variables.
From the demographic variables, I find a positive correlation in gender and economic
classes to individual pollution. Men were more likely to choose higher levels of pollution
and also, the higher the number of economic classes taken, the more likely is the
individual to choose a higher pollution choice. On the other hand, older and international
students were more likely to choose lower pollution levels.
Consistent with (A), the correlation between individual pollution and donation
amount is found to be statistically significant and negative with an increase in magnitude.
This negative correlation suggests that lower pollution level choices are likely to be
followed by higher donation amounts. I further test this using our second hypothesis
using firm profits as the dependant variable and donation amount as the explanatory
variable. The results are summarized in table 5.1.2.
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Table 5.1.2: Linear least squares regression estimation to test the correlation between firm
profits and donation

Variable
(Dependent variable = firm
profit)
Donation amount
T2

Coefficients
(A)
-2.6872***
(.9217)

(B)
-3.1226***
(.9260)

-82.1678***
(3.1372)
-79.3032***
(3.1372)
-101.4968***
(3.1372)
-

-82.1677***
(3.1132)
T3
-79.3032***
(3.1132)
T4
-101.4968***
(3.1132)
Gender
9.4197***
(1.7306)
Economic classes
.0560***
(.0138)
Age
-.0029*
(.0016)
International
-9.4729***
(1.7289)
Intercept
789.4275***
791.5393***
(2.2483)
(3.9299)
Observations
3100
3100
F statistic
309.68
163.73
R squared
0.28
0.30
Note: Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. *** 1% significance ** 5% significance * 10%
significance

Similar to table 5.1.1, using the no policy control (C1) as the baseline I observe the
correlation between firm profits and donation amount. In specification (A), I find a
statistically significant negative correlation between profits and donation amount. This
indicates that an individual making decisions that results in low take-home earnings is
more likely to donate more at the end of the experiment. For every 1 dollar increase in
donation, profits decreased by 2.69 experimental dollars. As compared to the no policy
control (C1), individuals in the treatments T2, T3 and T4 are found to be earning less
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profits as shown by the negative signs of the estimated coefficients of T2, T3 and T4
respectively. These coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. Twenty eight
percent of the variation in individual profits is explained by specification A.
Controlling for demographic variables such as respondent’s age, gender, number
of economic classes taken and if the student is international, I estimate the correlation
between firm profits and donation amount in specification (B). Comparing specifications
A and B, the negative sign is consistent. Here, for every 1 dollar increase in donation,
profits decrease by 3.12 experimental dollars. Thirty percent of the variation in individual
profits is explained by specification B. I thus find a two percent increase in the R squared
value which can be explained by addition of the demographic variables. From the
demographic variables, I find a positive correlation in gender and economic classes to
profits earned. Men were more likely to make profit maximizing decisions and also, the
higher the number of economic classes taken, the more likely is the individual to earn a
higher profit. On the other hand, older and international students were more likely to earn
less. Consistent with (A), the correlation between firm profits and donation amount is
found to be statistically significant and negative with an increase in magnitude. This
negative correlation suggests that decisions leading to a lower profit are likely to be
followed by higher donation amounts.
From table 5.1.1 I find the individuals choosing lower pollution levels were more
likely to donate at the end of experiment. Further, from table 5.1.2, participants earning
lower profits were also more likely to donate to the Chesapeake Bay Foundation. This
suggests that context does influence an individual's behavior in an experimental setting.
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6. CONCLUSION

Context in an experiment can influence participants behavior. When observing an
individual’s behavior within a laboratory setting, it may be noteworthy to consider
different aspects that could influence behavioral patterns. In this paper, I study whether
behavior is influenced by a pure profit motive or driven by the context of the
experimental setting employing the two-stage laboratory experiment of Palm-Forster et
al. (in press). In the first stage an individual’s behavior is observed through decisions
involving a choice of a technology to be adopted as well as a management choice which
jointly determined pollution levels. In the second stage, participants filled out a short
demographic survey after which they made a donation decision to the Chesapeake Bay
foundation. The take home earnings of a participant comprised of a general income
awarded to the individual, net production income resulting from management decisions,
minus the choice of a conservation technology where adopted, and donations.
Although the experiment consists of 20 rounds, resulting in a panel structure for
the data, this paper does not account for individually specific effects. Instead, a
convenient estimation strategy that uses pooled data is adopted in the analysis. From the
estimation results, a negative correlation between individual pollution and donation is
found, suggesting that participants who polluted less were more likely to donate.
Examining this relationship with respect to firm profits, it was observed that lower firm
profits were correlated with larger donation sums. This negative correlation between
individuals who earned less and donating more, suggests the existence of a context driven
response. Note that these effects are subject to change once the panel data structure is
accounted for. Thus, the results presented here are not ready to be cited. Improving upon
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this paper, varying the context of the experimental setting can elicit varying responses
driven by a pure change in context. Further, context might also help in replicating results
across cultures, languages and populations in which contextual instructions might have a
different meaning.
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